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Abstract
Agricultural trade problems have been receiving increased attention in the United States for the last few years.
The reason is obvious. After a decade during which the value of agricultural exports grew from $8 billion
annually to a peak of nearly $44 billion in 1981, both quantities and values of exports have fallen substantially.
Recent U.S. Department of Agriculture (*SDA) estimates project $32 billion in farm exports in 1985. In the
long history of U.S. agriculture, exports have often been a major force in agricultural prosperity and distress. It
is a natural tendency, therefore, to look at export growth as a solution to the dismal state of the farm economy.
Unfortunately, poor export performance is only one of a complex array of factors that have contributed to the
current distress in agriculture and many of these factors are jointly related to macroeconomic policies and
conditions as discussed by McCalla (1982); Freebairn, Rausser, and deGorter (1982); and Schuh (1984).
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Introduction 
Agricultural trade problems have been receiving increased 
attention in the United States for the last few years. The reason 
is obvious. After a decade during which the value of agricultural 
exports grew from $8 billion annually to a peak of nearly $44 
billion in 1981, both quantities and values of exports have fallen 
substantially. Recent USDA estimates project $32 billion in farm 
exports in 1985. In the long history of U.S. agriculture, exports 
have often been a major force in agricultural prosperity and 
distress. It is a natural tendency, therefore, to look at export 
growth as a solution to the dismal state of the farm economy. 
Unfortunately, poor export performance is only one of a complex 
array of factors that have contributed to the current distress 1n 
agriculture and many of these factors are jointly related to 
macroeconomic policies and conditions as discussed by McCalla 
(1982); Freebairn, Rauser, and deGorter (1982); and Schuh (1984). 
Empirical studies have verified the linkage between 
macroeconomic policies and conditions and U.S. agriculture. 
Chambers and Just (1982) estimated the impact of money supply 
changes on commodity markets. A recent study by Devadoss, Meyers, 
and Starleaf (1985) found that the contractionary monetary policy 
pursued by the U.S. government in the early 1980s put upward 
pressure on exchange rates and interest rates and had a substantial 
adverse effect on the farm economy. In a related study, Starleaf, 
Meyers, and Womack (1985) presented evidence that the real income of 
U.S. farmers has generally increased during periods of economic 
expansion and declined during periods of economic contraction. A 
recent study by Meyers, Thamodaran, and Helmar (1985) found that the 
stagnant income growth in foreign countries and the appreciation of 
the U.S. dollar had important adverse effects on U.S. agricultural 
exports. 
The major elements of change in the macroeconom1c environment 
from the 1970s to the 1980s are noted in Table l. The economtc 
policies that successfully wrung inflation out of the U.S. economy 
also slowed economic growth here and in many foreign countries. 
U.S. inflation rates fell more rapidly than interest rates, causing 
real rates of interest to rise. The 1981 tax cut reduced government 
revenues without an associated cutback in government expenditures, 
causing the federal budget deficit to increase rapidly and putting 
further upward pressure on real rates of interest. As foreign 
investors bought dollars to invest in the United States and earn 
these high returns, the dollar appreciated and made U.S. exports 
more costly abroad. The resulting decline in exports relative to 
imports created a substantial increase in the current account 
deficit. The world economic slowdown in the early 1980s, combined 
with high real interest rates and an appreciating dollar, 
contributed to debt crisis in many Third World economies. Public 
and private debt disbursements to developing countries declined and 
debt repayments increased until the net debt transfers became 
negative. 
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Table 1. 1980s Economic Environment Compared to 1970s 
Argentina Real GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) 
Brazil Real Income Annual Growth Rate (%) 
Canada Real GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) 
Eastern Europe Real GDP Annual Growth 
Rate (%) 
EC Real GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) 
Japan Real GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) 
USSR Real Income Annual Growth Rate (%) 
Spain Real GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) 
Thailand Real GDP Annual Growth Rate (%) 
U.S. Real GNP Annual Growth Rate (%) 
U.S. Infla·t ion Rate (%) 
U.S. Real Interest Rate (%) 
U.S. Budget Deficit Range 
(1980$ Bill ion) 
U.S. Current Account Range 
(1980$ Bill ion) 
1970s 
2.70 
5. 72 
4.50 
4. 10 
3. 10 
4.90 
3.00 
3.98 
7.06 
2.90 
5 to 10 
-I to 3 
IS to liS 
-20 to 8 
U.S. Exchange Rate Change (%) (1969-!980) -29 
1980-1984 
-1.32 
1.44 
1. 52 
2.48 
0. 94 
4.36 
0.02 
1. !6 
2.04 
1.80 
3 to 5 
5 to 9 
66 to !58 
2 to -81 
(1980-1984) +58 
Net Debt Transfers to 
Developing Countries 
(S Billion) 0978-1981) 30/yr. (1982-1983) -2/yr. 
U.S. Ag Export Changes 
(S Billion) 
U.S. Ag Program Costs 
(1983$ Bi 11 ion) 
(1971-1981) 35.8 (1981-1985) -14.8 
(1971-1981) 5/yr. (1982-1985) 14/yr. 
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All of these factors contributed to a substantial decline in 
U.S. agricultural exports from the peak in 1981. In addition to the 
weak foreign and domestic demand, the bumper crops in the United 
States in 1981 and 1982 set the stage for a substantial decline in 
farm prices, incomes} and land values. Commodity programs designed 
to provide a measure of protection to farm prices and income 
absorbed substantial amounts of the growing surplus by building 
stocks and reducing acreage planted. Program costs rose to nearly 
three times the rate of expenditures incurred during the 1970s. 
The reversal of conditions that existed before the turn of the 
decade could hardly have been more complete. Exchange rate changes 
and export declines can be viewed as casualties rather than causes 
of this turnaround. It is clear that macroeconomic policies and 
conditions have been a major element in this reversal. The large 
negative impacts of the changed macroeconomic conditions on 
agriculture are now widely acknowledged. The purpose of this 
analysis is to provide a quantitative evaluation of the impact of 
the changing macroeconomic environment on agricultural markets and 
trade. 
Analytical Method 
Since the adverse macroeconomic environment in the 1980s is 
hypothesized to have a substantial impact on commodity markets, the 
approach of this study is to ask what might have occurred had the 
1970s macroeconomic conditions continued into the 1980-84 period. 
In general, this entails a hypothetical 1980-84 scenario in which 
economic growth rates in the United States and abroad are higher and 
the U.S. dollar remains at the very favorable exchange levels of 
1979. This alternative scenario is compared to a baseline scenario 
which represents actual conditions existing during the period. 
The analysis is illustrated in Figure 1. The actual price and 
quantity levels for the period are represented by P0 (price), o0 (domestic demand), s0(domestic supply), and x0 (exports). Higher income growth rates would shift domestic and export demands to the 
right as indicated by (1) and (2). Preserving the favorable 1979 
exchange rates would make it possible for importers to buy more with 
one unit of their own currency, which would move export demand 
further to the right as in (3). All of these changes would generate 
a new price and quantity solution at P1 , D1, s1, and x1 . The foreign price PF may also rise but not as much as the U.S. price. 
Exports and domestic consumption may go up or down depending on the 
size of the demand shifts relative to the price change. The value 
of exports in U.S. dollars would increase from P0x0 to P1 x1 and 
value of production would increase from P
0
S
0 
to P1s1. The higher 
prices would very likely reduce substantially the costs of farm 
programs, which are designed to reduce price and income risk for 
producers. 
The U.S. livestock sector analysis is illustrated in Figure 2. 
Actual price and quantity levels for the period are represented by 
PL 0 (price) and QL 0 (quantity supplied and consumed). Assumed higher U.S. income group for the macroeconomic alternative increases 
demand for livestock products (1). As result of the crop sector 
changes, feed prices increase and shift livestock supply to the left 
l'r lcr! 
(' 
l 
\ 
\ 
4 
Price 
0 1 IJO 5o 5 1 Quantlty 
UUMESTlC 
~. 
(l) \ 
\ 
Quantity 
Figure l. Impacts of Increasing Income Growth Rates and a 
Depreciation of the U.S. Dollar 
Price 
\. 
~ 
PL 1 • • - - - - - - - - - -
PL 0 r----------,~~ 
I 
I 
I ~o, 
Do o~------~~-~--------~ 
OL 1 OL 0 Ouant1ty 
Figure 2. U.S. Livestock Sector under Alternative Economic 
Conditions 
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(2). An unambiguous effect of these changes is a livestock price 
increase from PL0 to PL 1 . Whether the quantity supplied increases 
or decreases depends on the relative magnitudes of the demand and 
supply shifts. Our analysis later indicates that livestock supply 
declines as shown here. 
Empirical Models 
The analysis is primarily conducted with an econometric 
regional trade model developed and maintained by the Food and 
Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at Iowa State 
University. The U.S. livestock sector impacts and linkages with 
crops were evaluated using the econometric livestock model 
maintained by FAPRI at the University of Missouri-Columbia. The 
trade model includes wheat, coarse grains, soybeans, and soymeal and 
explicitly incorporates exchange rates and price transmission 
relationships between countries and regions. A dynamic nonspatial 
equilibrium approach is used in this model. The basic elements of a 
nonspatial equilibrium supply and demand model are illustrated in 
Figure 3 and the corresponding mathematical model is given in 
Appendix A. Net imports and exports are determined in the model but 
not trade flows between specific regions. The net demands of 
importers (EDT) less the net supplies of other exporters (ESO) is 
the net excess demand facing the U.S. market (EDN). 
The major importers and exporters for each commodity are 
endogenized; these differ somewhat from commodity to commodity. 
Those countries for which parameters have not been directly 
estimated with econometric techniques have been assigned price and 
income response elasticities based on the best judgement of the USDA 
project task force. These elasticities are converted to net import 
elasticities and reported in Table A.8 in the Appendix. The 
regional coverage and the endogenous components of internal markets 
are evident in the Appendix summary tables of structural 
elasticities. A descriptive econometric approach is employed in the 
structural specification, so there are few constraints imposed in 
the estimation of the structural parameters. The functional form is 
generally linear. 
Assumptions for the Alternative Macroeconomic Scenario 
The baseline scenario for this analysis is simulated through 
the 1984/85 crop year using actual levels of all exogenous 
variables. Predetermined variables in the model are dynamically 
determined in the model simulation. The objective in developing the 
alternative scenario is to continue the macroeconomic conditions 
that prevailed in the 1970s. The variables in the model which are 
directly affected by macroeconomic conditions are income levels, 
inflation rates, and exchange rates. Other macroeconomic variables 
which play a minor role in the model are the U.S. interest rate, the 
Argentine budget deficit, and the international reserves of 
developing countries. Since the foreign livestock sectors are 
exogenous to this model, the livestock variables in other countries 
are linked to income levels in order to capture the effect of income 
growth changes on livestock product demand. 
The general approach to generating assumptions for the 
alternative scenario is given next to each one of the variables 
u.s. 
p 
sus 
p 
DUS 
Q 
U.S. FOREIGN 
TRADE NET TRADE 
ESUS p ESO p 
EON EDT 
"--~-~-
Q ESO Q p p 
Q 
IMPORTERS 
p 
DMl 
Q 
p 
OTHER EXPORTERS 
Figure J. Illustration of the Nunspatlal Equilibrium Supply and Demand t-lodel. 
DM2 
SX2 Q 
DX2 
Q 
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listed below: 
l. Income growth--l970s trend 
2. Inflation rates--1970s trend 
3. Exchange rate--constant real exchange rate 
plots of the actual data are compared to values under the 
alternative scenario in the Appendix Figures A.l to A.4. 
Economic growth rates in the 1980s were considerably lower in 
the United States and in many foreign countries compared to those in 
the 1970s (see Table 1). This slower growth is attributed primarily 
to the macroeconomic policies pursued by various count-ries in the 
1980s, especially the United States, and to a lesser degree to the 
oil price shock of the late 1970s. Considering this slower economic 
growth in the 1980s, the alternative macroeconomic assumption is to 
continue the income growth of the 1970s into the 1980s. Since most 
of the countries' income growth exhibited a trend growth in the 
1970s, the income growth rates for the 1980-84 alternative scenario 
were assumed to follow the 1970s trend. 
For most of the countries inflation rates in the first year or 
two of the 1980s were higher than the inflation rates in the 1970s 
because of the oil price shock in the later 1970s. The inflation 
rates declined subsequently in response to contractionary 
macroeconomic policies pursued by various countries. In the case of 
Argentina, inflation skyrocketed in 1983 and 1984 because of that 
country's expansionary monetary policy and huge budget deficit. The 
approach used to generate the inflation rates for the 1980-84 
alternative scenario is that these continue at their 1970s trend. 
For the exchange rate in the alternative scenario, it was 
assumed that the real exchange rate that existed in 1979 would 
continue. This means that the exchange rate of the United States 
relative to each of the foreign currencies included would change 
only by the amount necessary to offset differing rates of inflation. 
This is equivalent to maintaining purchasing power parity at the 
1979 level. 
Considering the significant rise in real interest rates 1n the 
1980s, the alternative assumption for the U.S. real interest rate 
was to maintain it at a long run rate equal to 3 percent. 
Argentina's budget deficit has increased rapidly in the 1980s. In 
the alternative scenario, the budget deficit is maintained at its 
1980 level. International reserves of developing countries in the 
1980s were assumed to follow the trend which prevailed in the 
1970s. 
This study does not investigate whether this hypothetical 
macroeconomic environment could have been achieved during the 1980s 
or how it could have been achieved. Rather it assumes that the 
1970s macroeconomic conditions continued into the 1980s. Given this 
assumption, the effects of these favorable macroeconomic conditions 
on the U.S. agricultural market are evaluated and compared to what 
occurred under actual macroeconomic conditions. This comparison 
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provides insight into the importance to agriculture of the change 1n 
macroeconomic conditions that was experienced in the 1980s. 
Analytical Procedure and U.S. Policy Adjustments 
The impacts of alternative macroeconomic policies were 
generated by first running a baseline and then running the 
alternative macroeconomic scenario for 1980-84. The difference 
between the two scenarios is a measure of the dynamic impacts of the 
changed macroeconomic environment over the five-year period. 
Several steps were involved in this process: 
1. The alternative macroeconomic assumptions were imposed on 
the individual commodity trade models and the U.S. 
livestock model. New equilibrium supply, demand, pr1ce, 
and trade results were estimated with the models. 
2. To incorporate the cross-commodity interaction among these 
commodities, the new price estimates were passed between 
the crop models until a new cross-commodity equilibrium 
was obtained. 
3. To incorporate the cross-commodity interaction between feed 
and livestock in the United States, the new crop and 
livestock prices and livestock animal unit indic~s were 
passed between the crop and livestock models until a new 
cross-commodity equilibrium was obtained. 
4. Adjustments in commodity program provisions were made 
according to the new price level estimates. Where prices 
were above the release level for wheat and corn, the grain 
was removed from the farmer-owned grain reserve (FOR) 
either until the price was lowered to the release price or 
until the reserves were exhausted, whichever came first. 
If the reserves were exhausted and the price was still 
above the government-owned stock release level, then 
government-owned stocks were released until the prtce was 
lowered to the government release price level. Stock 
accumulations in the FOR were also adjusted for changing 
price levels. Then, if the price in a year prior to an 
actual paid diversion or PIK program was $.10/bushel below 
the target price or higher, the paid diversion or PIK 
program was eliminated. 
5. This process was continued until all the models were in 
equilibrium and the policy conditions were satisfied. In 
the end the PIK program and all paid diversions were 
removed for wheat and corn and substantial quantities of 
FOR and government stocks were released to the market. 
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Evaluation Results 
The results of the macroeconomic impact analysis are discussed 
first in terms of the estimated effects on major traded 
crops--wheat, corn, and soybeans. These results include effects on 
major importing and exporting countries and regions. Next, several 
measures of the aggregate industry impacts across commodities will 
be presented including acreage planted, value of crop production, 
value of agricultural exports, cash receipts from crops and 
livestock, and net farm income. Finally, some measures of the 
impacts on goverrument programs are presented including the level of 
government stocks and the cost of commodity programs. All the 
measures are summarized by taking the average of the last four years 
of the period, crop years 1981/82 to 1984/85, and comparing the 
difference between the alternative macro scenario and the baseline. 
The year-by-year data are presented in the tables and figures which 
accompany the discussion. 
Wheat 
The more favorable macroeconomic assumptions tncrease wheat 
exports over the last four years of the period by nearly 18 percent 
(Table 2). There is also an increase in wheat feed demand in some 
years because of its more favorable price relative to coarse grains, 
but the net effect is a slight decline in wheat feeding over the 
four year period. The stronger export demand reduces carryover 
stocks, increases prices by nearly 20 percent, and increases annual 
wheat supply an average of nearly five percent. Wheat supply 
actually declines in the first two years because the decline tn 
beginning stocks is greater than the increase in production. In the 
last two years there are large increases in planted acres as a 
result of the removal of PIK and paid diversion acreage reduction 
programs. 
Total net exports of the major exporting countries increase an 
average of only 2.5 percent, but the United States gains market 
share at the expense of the EC and Argentina (Table 3). The higher 
income growth rates in the EC and Argentina lead to larger domestic 
consumption and less wheat available for export. The U.S. market 
share, instead of falling by 12 percentage points in the 1982/84 
period, maintains a level equal to or greater than the share in 
1979/80. 
In the import markets the higher income growth assumed under 
the macro alternative scenario is in some cases being offset by the 
higher prices of wheat (Table 4). China's imports decline the most 
because trend income growth in the alternative scenario is lower 
than what actually occurred. In the USSR, East Europe, Africa and 
the Middle East, and other West Europe income effects dominate price 
effects, but in other regions there is either a decline or only a 
slight increase in net imports. 
lO 
TABLE 2. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON U.S. WHEAT DOMESTIC SUPPLY AND USE 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 81-84 ,;vE 
----------------------(MILLION METRIC TONSl----------------------
ACTUAL 
SUPPLY 83.23 89.35 102.71 I 06,79 107.09 I 08.70 I 06.32 
Da-1EST IC USE 21.31 21 ,31 23.05 24,71 30,24 31.38 27.3 5 
EXPORTS 37.42 41.20 48.20 41.07 38.89 38. 75 41.73 
END STOCKS 24.50 26,84 31.46 41 .01 3 7,96 38.57 37.2 5 
PRICE ($/MTl 138.89 143.67 134,11 130.44 129.71 124,19 129.61 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
SUPPLY 83,23 89.35 99,05 105.65 116,10 12 5.13 Ill .4 8 
Oa-1ESTIC USE 21.31 21.39 21 ,24 24.99 30,54 31.48 27.09 
EXPORTS 37.42 44.10 50,40 4 7. 92 45.46 51, 79 48.89 
END STOCKS 24.50 23,86 27,41 32.74 40.00 41.86 35.50 
PRICE ($/MTl 138.89 139.63 157.80 154.59 I 63.75 144,08 155.06 
PERCENT CHANGE -----------------------------(PERCENTl---------------------------
SUPPLY o.oo o.oo -3.56 -1 .07 8.41 I 5 ,II 4. 72 
Da-1ESTIC USE o.oo 0,38 -7.85 I .13 I .32 0,32 -I .2 7 
EXPORTS o. 00 7,04 4. 56 16.58 16.89 33,65 17.95 
END STOCKS o.oo -11,10 -12,87 -20.1 7 5.3 7 8,53 -4.73 
PRICE ($/MTl o.oo -2.81 17,66 18.51 26,24 16,02 19.61 
ll 
TABLE 3. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON WHEAT NET EXPORTS BY EXPORTER 
YEAR 79/80 80/8 I 31/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 81-84 AVE 
------------------------(MILLION METRIC TONSI----------------------------
ACTUAL 
CANADA ) 5.00 17 .oo 17.60 21.40 21.80 19.40 20.05 
AUSTRAL I A 15.00 I 0.60 II. 00 B. I 0 I O. 60 I 5.30 II. 25 
EC 5 .I 0 I 0.20 I 0.80 I I. 70 11.80 15.30 12.40 
ARGENTINA 4.80 3.90 4.30 7. 50 9.70 s.oo 7.38 
TOTAL NON-U.S. 39.90 41.70 43.70 48.70 53.90 58.00 51.08 
UNITED STATES 37.42 41 .20 48.20 41.07 38.89 38.75 41.73 
EXPORT SHARE (~) 48.40 49.70 52.45 45.75 41.91 40.05 45.04 
WORLD TOTAL 77.32 82.90 91 .90 89.77 92.79 96.75 92 .so 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
CANADA 15.00 I 7.00 18.17 22.59 23.42 20.39 21 .14 
AUSTRAL I A 15.00 I o. 56 II. 23 7. 98 10.63 14.83 II. I 7 
EC 5. I 0 I 0.02 9.49 7.41 7.00 II .11 8.75 
ARlENTI NA 4.80 3.80 3.14 4. 68 7. 53 5.60 5.24 
TOTAL NON-U.S. 39.90 41.38 42.03 42.66 48.58 51.93 46.30 
UNITED STATES 37.42 44 .I 0 50.40 4 7.92 45.46 51.79 48.89 
EXPORT SHARE (~) 48.40 51. 59 54.53 52.90 48.34 49.93 51.43 
WORLD TOTAL 77.32 85.48 92.43 90.58 94.04 I 03.72 95.JJ 
PERCENT CHANGE ---------------------------------(PERCENT I------------------------------
CANADA o.oo o.oo 3.24 5.56 7.43 5.1 0 5.3 3 
AUSTRAL I A o.oo -0.38 2. 09 -1.48 0.28 -3.07 -o. 54 
EC o.oo -1.76 -12.13 -36.67 -40.68 -2 7.39 -29.2 I 
ARJENTI NA o.oo -2.56 -26.98 -37.60 -22.37 -30.00 -29.24 
TOTAL NON-U.S. o.oo -0.77 -3.82 -12.40 -9.87 -10.47 -9.14 
UNITED STATES o.oo 7.04 4.56 16.68 16.89 33.65 I 7. 9 5 
EXPORT SHARE 1%1 o.oo 3.81 3.96 15.64 15.34 24.67 14.90 
WORLD TOTAL o.oo 3 .II 0.58 0.90 I .3 5 7.20 2.51 
1: 
TABLE 4. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON WHEAT NET IMPORTS BY IMPORTERS 
YEAR 79/80 80/8 I 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/8 5 81-84 AVE 
----------------------- ( M I L L1 ON .~E TR I C TONS)------------------------
ACTUAL 
JAPAN 5.49 5.70 5.60 s.ao 5.90 5.60 s. 73 
I .~DIA -o.4a o.oo 2.26 2.39 2.50 0. I 5 I .a3 
USSR I 1.60 15.50 19.00 19.70 20.00 27. I 0 2 I .4 5 
CHINA a.90 13.80 13.20 13.00 9.60 7. 40 1 o.ao 
E. ELROPE s.oo 3.40 4.30 2.20 I. 50 -1 .so I .63 
AFRICA & M.E. I 7. Oa I 7. 04 la.27 I 6.99 22.a5 24.99 20. 7a 
OTH. ASIA 12.56 I I. 19 1 I .1 7 12.09 12.9a I 4.21 I 2.61 
OTH. LAT. AMERICA a. 54 7. 57 a.30 a. 19 a. sz a.97 s. 50 
OTH. w. ELROPE I .28 0.45 1 .29 -0.52 0.34 -0.46 O. I 6 
RCW* 7.35 a.25 a. s1 9.93 a.60 I 0.29 9.33 
WORLD TOTAL 77.32 a2.90 91.90 89.77 92.79 96.75 92 .so 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
JAPAN 5.49 5. 71 5.60 5.84 5.95 5.66 5.76 
INDIA -0.4a o.oo 2. 26 2.39 2.50 O. I 5 I .a3 
USSR I 1 .60 18.29 22.9a 23.40 23.67 30.55 2 5. I 5 
CHINA a.90 I 2. 72 12.36 I 0.90 6.as 6.94 9.26 
E. ELROPE s.oo 3.a3 4.61 2. 61 I. 91 -1 .14 2.00 
AFRICA & M.E. I 7. 08 I 7. 73 19. 19 la.27 24.80 2a.a9 22.79 
OTH. ASIA 12.56 1 I • I 5 I 0.44 1 I .4a 12.57 14. I 0 I 2. I 5 
OTH. LAT • AMERICA a. 54 7. 65 7.a3 7. 70 7. 79 B. 53 7. 96 
OTH. W. ELROPE I .2a 0.4 I 0.57 -0.9a 0.05 -0.94 -0.33 
RCW* 7.35 a.oo 6. 60 a.9a 7. 95 I 0.97 3.63 
WORLD TOTAL 77.32 85.49 92.44 90.59 94.04 103.71 95.20 
PERCENT CHANGE --------------------------------(PERCENT)------------------------------
JAPAN o.oo o. Ia o.oo 0.69 o.a5 I .07 0.65 
INDIA o.oo o.oo o. 00 o.oo o.oo o. 00 o. 00 
USSR o.oo 1a.oo 20.95 18.78 la.35 12.73 I 7. 70 
CHINA o.oo -7.a3 -6.36 -16.15 -28.65 -6.22 -14.34 
E. ELROPE o.oo 12.65 7.21 1a.64 27.33 -24.00 7.29 
AFRICA & M.E. o.oo 4.05 5. 04 7. 53 a. 53 I 5. 6 I 9. Ia 
OTH. ASIA o.oo -0.36 -6.54 -5.05 -3. I 6 -0.77 -3.8a 
OTH. LAT. AMERICA o.oo I. 06 -5.66 -5.9a -8.57 -4.91 -6.2a 
OTH. w. ELROPE o.oo -a.S9 -55.81 a8.46 -85.29 104.35 I 2.93 
RCW* o.oo -3.03 -22.44 -9.57 -7.56 6.61 -8.24 
WORLD TOTAL o.oo 3.12 0.59 0.91 1.35 7.19 2. 5 I 
* Rest of Wor I d 
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Corn 
Estimated U.S. corn exports during the last four years under 
the more favorable macroeconomic assumptions increase an average of 
35 percent over the actual levels (Table 5). Ending stocks are 
drawn down by more than a third from actual levels and prices on 
average increase by nearly 16 percent. The larger stock drawdown 
compared with wheat is due to the fact that corn release trigger 
prices for the farmer-owned reserve and government-owned stocks are 
quite a bit lower relative to loan rates than those of wheat. Total 
supply increases slightly--more than one percent on average during 
the period--but there is a substantial increase in production which 
is offset by the declining inventories. Feed demand was up, in 
spite of higher prices, because of the more rapid income growth in 
the United States and the consequent livestock demand ex pans ion. 
The average increase in net exports of the major exporting 
countries for the period is about 15 percent (Table 6). This is 
larger than is the case for wheat, since the income elasticity for 
feed grains is larger than that for wheat. The United States also 
gains market share as a result of higher incomes and increased 
domestic consumption in other exporting countries. As is the case 
with wheat, the U.S. export share, instead of declining by 10 
percentage points over the period, remains on average near the peak 
level in 1979/80. 
The 15 percent average growth in imports comes primarily from 
the EC, Spain, and the USSR (Table 7). For the other regions, the 
effect of higher income growth is choked off by the higher prices. 
The most dramatic story on the import side is the European 
..._ommunity. Instead of moving from a net import position of 9 
million tons in 1979/80 to a net export position in 1984/85, EC net 
imports remain relatively stable around the 9 million ton level. 
Since EC internal prices are fixed and are not affected by the 
changes that are occurring in international prices, the income 
growth effects are not at all dampened by increases in world market 
price levels. 
Soybeans 
Estimated soybean exports of the United States under the more 
favorable macroeconomic assumptions increase on an average of over 
20 percent in the last four years of the period (Table 8). Part of 
this increased export volume is drawn from domestic crushing use and 
stocks, but a larger amount comes from a more than 4 percent 
increase in domestic supplies. Price is driven up by about 20 
percent on average during this period as a result of the increased 
export demand. 
The exports of major exporting countries increase by nearly 
13 percent on average during the period (Table 9). The exports of 
Brazil and Argentina decline due to increases in domestic use. In 
Brazil, soybean exports drop to nearly half their actual levels, but 
most of Brazil's exports are in the fom of soymeal. The United 
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TABLE 5, EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON u.S. CORN DOMESTIC SUPPLY AND USE 
YEAR 79/80 80/8 I 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 81-84 AVE 
-------------------------(MILLION METRIC TONS)----------------------------
ACTUAL 
SUPPLY 234.51 209.71 232.50 264,40 185,30 213,30 223,88 
DOMESTIC USE 131,64 123,63 127,32 137.65 119,56 131.53 129,02 
EXPORTS 61,80 59.82 49,96 4 7. 50 4 7,37 46,69 4 7,88 
END STOCKS 41.07 26,26 55,22 79,25 18,3 7 35,08 46,98 
PRICE ($/MTl 99,21 122.43 98,42 I 06,29 129.91 I 04,33 I 09,74 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
SUPPLY 234,51 209.71 229,63 246.24 200,97 223.72 225.14 
D()'.IESTIC USE 131,64 120,97 130,26 138,60 124.16 129.78 130,70 
EXPORTS 61,80 65.53 58.50 62. II 65,99 71,30 64.48 
END STOCKS 41,07 23.21 40,8 7 45,53 10.82 22,64 29,97 
PRICE ($/MTl 99,21 126,90 I 05,01 125,60 I 57, 53 121,79 12 7,48 
PERCENT CHANGE ----------------------------------(PERCNETl-------------------------------
SUPPLY 0,00 o.oo -1.23 -6.87 8,46 4,88 I ,31 
D()'.IESTIC USE o.oo -2.15 2,31 0,69 3,85 -1.33 I ,38 
EXPORTS o.oo 9,55 17,09 30,76 39,31 52,71 34,97 
END STOCKS o.oo -11.61 -25,99 -42,55 -41,10 -35.46 -36.27 
PRICE ($/MTl 0,00 3,65 6,70 18,17 21 ,26 16.74 15.71 
l5 
TABLE 6. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON FEE~JRAINS NET EXPORTS BY EXPORTERS 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 31-84 AVE 
------------------------IMI LLION METRIC TONS>----------------------------
ACTUAL 
ARGENTINA 5.13 13.88 10.14 11 .41 10.67 10.42 10.66 
CANNJA 3. 64 3.35 6.62 5.80 6.61 3.22 5. 56 
AUSTRALIA 3.89 2.84 3.38 I .24 5.75 6.66 4.26 
THAI LAND 2.34 2.40 3. 51 2. 33 3. II 3.35 3. 08 
SOUTH AFRICA 3. 72 4.93 4.57 -2.33 0.80 0.97 I .00 
TOTAL NON-U.S. 18.72 27.40 28.22 18.45 26.94 24.62 24.56 
UNITED STATES 71 .07 69.21 58.40 54.00 55.80 55.50 55.93 
EXPORT SHARE 1%) 79. 15 71.64 67.42 74. 53 67.44 69.27 69.67 
WORLD TOTAL 89.79 96.61 86.62 72.45 82.74 80.12 80.48 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
ARGENTINA 5.13 13.66 9.3 7 6.98 7.23 6.29 7.47 
CANNJA 3.64 2.96 6.62 4.55 6.96 1.89 5. 03 
AUSTRALIA 3.89 2.89 3.53 I .57 6.1 0 6.79 4.50 
THAI LAND 2.34 2.30 3. 18 I. 80 2.36 2.41 2.44 
SOUTH AFRICA 3. 72 5.34 4. 72 -2.54 0.32 0.20 0.68 
TOTAL NON-U.S., lB. 72 27 .I 5 27.42 12.46 22.97 1 7.58 20.11 
UNITED STATES 71 .07 74.92 66.94 68.61 74.42 80.11 72.52 
EXPORT SHARE 1% I 79.15 73.40 70.94 34.63 76.41 82.00 78.50 
WORLD TOTAL 89.79 102.07 94.36 81.07 97.39 97.69 92.63 
PERCENT CHANGE ---------------------------------I PERCENT>------------------------------
ARGENTINA o.oo -1.59 -7.59 -38.83 -32.24 -39.64 -29.5 7 
CANNJA o.oo -11.64 o.oo -19.83 5.30 -41.30 -13.96 
AUSTRAL lA o.oo 1.76 4.,44 26.61 6.09 1 .95 9. 77 
THAI LANO o.oo -4.17 -9.40 -22. 75 -24.12 -28.06 -21.08 
SOUTH AFRICA o.oo 8.32 3.28 9.01 -60.00 -79.38 -31.77 
TOTAL NON-U.S. o.oo -0.91 -2.83 -32.4 7 -14.74 -28.59 -19.66 
UNITED STATES o.oo 8.25 14.62 27.06 33.3 7 44.34 29 .a 5 
EXPORT SHARE 1%) o.oo 2.46 5.22 13.55 13.31 18.38 12.61 
WORLD TOTAL o.oo 5.65 8.94 11.90 1 7. 71 21.93 1 5.1 2 
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TABLE 7, EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON FEErGRAINS NET IMPORTS BY IMPORTERS 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 81-84 WE 
------------------------(MILLION METRIC TONSJ----------------------------
ACTUAL 
EC 9,30 6,56 5,45 I • 79 1 .24 -4.04 I .I I 
JAPAN 18,89 18,86 18.32 18,70 20.51 20,41 19,49 
SPAIN 5,90 3. 72 7,79 6, 72 4.80 3,42 5,68 
USSR 18,40 18,00 25.50 11,30 11.50 27,00 18,83 
E. ELROP 8,80 9.76 4,85 0,78 0,97 0,58 1,80 
HI INCOM E ASIA 6,18 6. 79 7,88 9.23 8,69 8, 72 8, 63 
ROW* 22,32 32.92 16,83 23.93 35,03 24,03 24,96 
TOTAL 89,79 96,61 86,62 72,45 82,74 80,12 80.48 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
EC 9.30 6,79 10,14 10,11 10.92 6,36 9,38 
JAPAN 18,89 18.83 18,44 19,09 20,94 20.72 19,80 
SPAIN 5,90 4,03 8,66 7. 95 6,33 5,27 7,05 
USSR 18,40 19.87 28.16 13.79 15.19 29.79 21. 73 
E. ELROPE 8,80 12.34 4,54 0,13 0,48 0,33 1 .3 7 
HI INCOME E ASIA 6, 18 6. 77 7. 4 7 8. 25 7. 73 7,85 7,83 
ROW* 22.32 33,44 16.96 21,80 35,80 27,39 25,49 
TOTAL 89,79 102.07 94.3 7 81,12 97.39 97.71 92,65 
PERCENT CHANGE ---------------------------------(PERCENT)------------------------------
EC o.oo 3. 51 86,06 464,80 780.65 -257,43 268,52 
JAPAN o.oo -0,16 0.66 2. 09 2,10 1. 52 I, 59 
SPAIN o.oo 8.33 11 ,1 7 18,30 31.88 54,09 28,86 
USSR o. 00 1 0,39 10,43 22,04 32.09 I 0, 33 18,72 
E. ELROPE o.oo 26,43 -6,39 -83,33 -50.52 -43,1 0 -45,34 
HI INCOME E ASIA o.oo -0.29 -5.20 -1 o. 62 -11.05 -9,98 -9.21 
ROW* o.oo 1. 58 o. 77 -8,90 2.20 13,98 2,01 
TOTAL o.oo 5.65 8,95 11.97 1 7. 71 21 ,95 1 5,14 
* Rest of World 
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TABLE 8, EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON U.S. SOY9EANS DOMESTIC SUPPLY AND USE 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 a 1/82 82/83 83/84 84/8 5 81-84 AVE 
-------------------------(MILLION METRIC TONS I----------------------------
ACTUAL 
SUPPLY 66,30 58.68 62.65 66.54 53.90 55.43 59.63 
DOMESTIC USE 32.72 30.45 30.44 32.53 28.91 30.55 30.61 
EXPORTS 23.82 19.71 25.28 24.63 20.21 16.28 21.60 
END STOCKS 9.76 8.52 6.93 9.38 4. 78 8,60 7,42 
ffi ICE ($MT) 230.75 278,15 221,93 209.07 286.97 213 ,II 232.77 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
SUPPLY 66.30 58,68 60.33 68.50 57.55 61.72 62.03 
DOMESTIC USE 32.72 30.3 7 27.83 32.60 25.00 31 .I 5 29.1 4 
EXPORTS 23.82 21, I 5 26,83 27.90 26.03 21.78 25.63 
END STOCKS 9. 76 7 .I 6 5,68 s.oo 6.52 8. 79 7.2 5 
ffi ICE ($/MTI 230.75 276.68 2 71.16 252.80 355.31 237.36 2 79. I 6 
PERCENT CHANGE ----------------------------------(PERCENTl-------------------------------
SUPPLY o.oo o.oo -3.70 2.94 6. 77 II ,3 5 4.34 
DOMESTIC USE o.oo -0.27 -8.59 0.23 -13.54 I. 9 7 -4,98 
EXPORTS o.oo 7. 31 6. 12 13.26 28.82 33.76 20.49 
ENO STOCKS o.oo -15.96 -18.03 -14,75 36.39 2.21 I ,4 6 
ffi ICE ($/MT) o.oo -0.53 22,18 20,92 23.82 11.38 19.57 
[R 
TABLE 9. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON SOYBEAN NET EXPORTS BY EXPORTERS 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 81-84 AVE 
------------------------(MILLION METRIC TONSJ----------------------------
ACTUAL 
BRAZIL 1.06 0.56 -0.3 7 1.23 I. 59 3.10 1 .3 9 
AffiENT INA 2. 73 z. 19 1.88 1.42 z. 9 7 3.29 z. 39 
CHINA -0.60 -0.40 -0.38 0.29 o. 73 1.05 0.42 
TOTAL NON-U.S. 3.19 2.35 1 .13 2.94 5.29 7.44 4.20 
UNITED STATES 23.82 19.71 25.28 24.63 20.21 16.28 21 .60 
EXPORT SHARE <%) 88.19 89.35 95.72 89.34 79.25 68.63 83.24 
WORLD TOTAL 27.01 22.06 26.41 27.57 25.50 23.72 25.80 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
BRAZIL I .06 0.59 -0.13 1.06 0.40 1.50 a. 71 
AffiENTINA z. 73 2. 19 1.88 ) • 35 2.65 3. 19 2.27 
CHINA -0.60 -0.37 -0.36 0.32 0.86 1.08 0.48 
TOTAL NON-U.S. 3.19 2.41 1 .39 2. 73 3. 91 5. 77 3.4 5 
UNITED STATES 23.82 21.1 6 26.83 27.88 26.04 21.80 25.64 
EXPORT SHARE <%) 88.19 89.81 95.11 91.38 86.57 79. 14 88.05 
WORLD TOTAL 21 .at 23.57 28.22 30.61 29.95 27.57 29 .J9 
PERCENT CHANGE ---------------------------------<PERCENT!-------------------------------
BRAZIL o.oo 5.36 -64.86 -13.82 -74.84 -51.61 -51 .29 
AffiENT INA a. oo a. oo a. oo -4.93 -1 a. 77 -3.04 -4.69 
CHINA o.oo -7.50 -5.26 10.34 t7 .at 2.86 6.44 
TOTAL NON-U.S. o.oo 2.55 23.01 -7.14 -26.09 -22.45 -8.1 7 
UNITED STATES o.oo 7.36 6.13 13.20 28.85 33.91 20.52 
EXPORT SHARE ( %1 o.oo a. 52 -0.64 2.29 9.23 15.30 6. 55 
WORLD TOTAL o.oo 6.84 6.85 11 .03 1 7.4 5 16.23 12.89 
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States gains on average 5 percentage points 1n export share. During 
the last two years the gains are over 7 and 10 percentage points, 
respectively. 
The major source of growth in imports, again, is in the 
developed couGtries (Table 10). Europe, JapaG, and the USSR all 
increase imports, with the EC being the major growth area in volume. 
In the rest of the world the increased demand for soybeans is choked 
off by the higher prices. 
Industry Performance Measures 
The higher prices and the removal of PIK and paid diversion 
programs under the alternative scenario combine to increase acreage 
planted in all three crops, especially during the last two years of 
the period (Table 11 and Figure 4). The largest increases are 
during the PIK year (1983/84) for wheat and corn, and the following 
year for wheat, when there is a large paid diversion program. The 
estimated planted acreage path looks much like the acreage path of 
the mid-1970s. 
A combination of higher prtces and higher acreage planted 
increase the estimated value of crop production by an average of 
30 percent over the last four years (Table 12 and Figure 5). Corn 
gains a value of over $5 billion per year and wheat and soybean each 
ga1n over $3 billion a year. Wheat gains slightly more than the 
other two crops in percentage, because of the larger acreage gai0s 
1n wheat. 
The estimated value of exports increases because of ris~s in 
the volumes and the price levels resulting from the alternative 
scenario (Table 13 and Figure 6). On average, the value of exports 
gains nearly 50 percent for these commodities during the last four 
years of the period. Corn and soybeans gain relatively more than 
wheat, since their demand response to world income growth is 
larger. 
Estimates of the net farm income impact of the macroeconomtc 
alternative scenario are derived in a standard farm sector balance 
sheet. Since these are usually done on a calendar year basis, only 
calendar years 1981-84 are covered by this analysis. Increases in 
cash receipts from marketings grow from about $1.3 billion in 1981 
to over $15 billion in 1984 (Table 14). Most of these increases 
come from crop marketings, since livestock receipts under the macro 
alternative decline slightly in the first two years and increase 
slightly in the last two. Government payments to producers for 
target price support, paid diversion (including PIK), and disaster 
payments decline under this scenario by $0.9 to $1.4 billion in the 
first two years and by $6 to $7 billion in the last two years. The 
large reduction in payments the last two years reflects the removal 
of the PIK program for acreage reduction. The increase in total 
receipts ranges from $0.5 to $10.5 billion and averages $5 billion 
per year. 
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TABLE I O. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON SOYBEAN NET IMPORTS BY IMPORTERS 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/8 5 81-84 AVE 
------------------------!MILLION METRIC TONS I----------------------------
ACTUAL 
EC 11.98 1 o.o1 12.35 11.89 9.69 9.81 I 0.94 
SPAIN 3.10 2. 79 3.20 3. 04 2.60 2.00 2. 71 
JAPAN 4.40 4.21 4.49 4.87 4. 73 4.61 4.68 
E.EUROPE 0.85 o. 52 0.48 o. 78 0.84 o. 59 0.67 
USSR 1.4 7 1.39 1.48 1.05 0.95 o.a5 1 .oa 
ROoo/* 5.21 3.14 4.41 5. 94 6. 69 5.86 5. 73 
WORLD TOTAL 27.01 22.06 26.41 2 7. 57 25.50 23.72 25.80 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
EC 11.98 10.92 13.84 14. I 7 12.72 12.29 13.26 
SPAIN 3.10 3.26 3.67 4.07 •• 09 3. 13 3. 74 
JAPAN 4.40 4.25 4.52 4.91 4.84 4. 72 4.75 
E.EUROPE o.a5 o. 58 o. 55 0.85 I. 19 0.85 0.86 
USSR I .4 7 I .43 I. 52 1.08 0.98 o.a 7 I .II 
ROoo/* 5.21 3.15 4.10 5. 52 6. 15 5. 70 5. 3 7 
WORLD TOTAL 27.01 23.59 28.20 30.60 29.97 2 7. 56 29.08 
PERCENT CHANGE ---------------------------------!PERCENT I-------------------------------
EC o.oo 9.09 12.06 19.18 31 .2 7 25.28 21.95 
SPA I~ o.oo 16.85 14.69 33.88 57.31 56.50 40.59 
JAPAN o.oo 0.95 0.67 0.82 2.33 2.39 I. 55 
E .EUROPE o. 00 II. 54 14.58 B. 97 41.67 44.07 27.32 
USSR o.oo 2.88 2.70 2.86 3 .I 6 2.3 5 2. 77 
ROoo/* o. 00 0.32 -7.03 -7.07 -8.07 -2. 73 -6.23 
WCRLD TOTAL o.oo 6.94 6. 78 I 0.99 17.53 16.19 12 .a 7 
* Rest ot Wor I d 
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TABLE II, EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON U.S. PLANTED ACREAGE OF WHEAT, CORN, AND SOYBEANS 
YEAR 
ACTUAL 
WHEAT 
CORN 
SOVEEANS 
TOTAL 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
WHEAT 
CORN 
SOYBEANS 
TOTAL 
PERCENT CHANGE 
WHEAT 
CORN 
SOYBEANS 
TOTAL 
79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83184 84/8 5 81-84 AVE 
------------------------------1 .~ILL ION ACRES 1---------------------------
71 .6 
81,4 
71.6 
224,6 
71 .6 
81.4 
71.6 
224,6 
80.6 
84.0 
69,9 
234.5 
80,6 
84.0 
69,9 
234.5 
88,9 
84. 1 
67.5 
240.5 
88.1 
84.2 
66.4 
238,7 
87.4 
81,9 
70.9 
240,2 
90,7 
80.8 
74.7 
246.2 
76,4 
60.2 
63.8 
200.4 
97.9 
85.3 
71 .o 
254.2 
79.2 
80.5 
67.7 
227.4 
96,3 
84.5 
73,8 
254.6 
83.0 
76. 7 
67,5 
227 .I 
93.2 7 
83.70 
71 .48 
248,44 
----------------------------------<PERCENT)-------------------------------
o.o o.o -0.9 3.8 28.1 21.6 13. I 5 
o.o o.o o. 1 -1.3 41.7 5. 0 11.36 
o.o o.o -1 .6 5,4 11.3 9.0 6.01 
o.o o.o -0.7 2.5 26.8 12. D I 0,14 
Fjgure 4. U.S. PLANTED ACREJ\GE 
(WHEAT, CORN, SOYBEANS) 
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TABLE 12. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON VALUE OF U.S. PRODUCTION OF WHEAT, CORN, AND 
SOYBEANS 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 81-84 AVE 
----------------------------(MILLION DOLLARSl----------------------------
ACTUAL 
WHEAT 8070 9310 10166 9822 8548 8768 932 6 
CORN 19979 2064 7 20297 22234 13777 20337 19151 
SOYBEANS 14199 13611 12013 12461 12777 10794 12011 
TOTAL 4224 7 43567 424 76 44517 35102 39898 40498 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
WHEAT 8070 9028 11930 12098 13449 12143 12405 
CORN 19979 21395 21661 25962 24292 25876 24448 
SOYBEANS 14199 13542 14407 15839 17570 13114 I 5233 
TOTAL 4224 7 43965 4 7998 53898 55310 51134 5208 5 
PERCENT CHANGE ---------------------------------<PERCENT)-------------------------------
WHEAT o.o -3.0 l7 .4 23.2 57.3 38.5 34.1 
CORN o.o 3. 6 6. 7 16,8 76.3 27.2 31.8 
SOYBEANS o.o -0.5 19.9 27. I 37.5 21.5 26.5 
TOTAL o.o 0.9 13.0 21 .I 57,6 28.2 30.0 
z 
0 
55 
50 
45 
40 
35 
::J 30 
iii 
25 
20 
15 
FJgure 5. VALUE OF U.S. PRODUCTION 
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TABLE 13. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON VALUE OF u.s. EXPORTS OF 'ffHEAT, CORN, AND SOYBEANS 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 31/82 82/83 83/84 84/8 5 81-84 ,WE 
-----------------------------(MILLION DOLLARS>----------------------------
ACTUAL 
WHEAT 5197 5919 6464 5357 5044 4812 5420 
CORN 6131 7324 4917 5049 6154 4871 5248 
SOYBEANS 5496 5482 5610 5149 5800 3469 5007 
TOTAL 16825 18725 16992 15555 16998 13153 15674 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
WHEAT 5197 6144 7996 7366 7391 748 7 7560 
CORN 6131 8281 6099 7767 I 0353 8646 8216 
SOYBEANS 5496 5860 7301 6994 9213 5163 7168 
TOTAL 16825 20285 21396 22127 25957 21296 22944 
PERCENT CHANGE ---------------------------------<PERCENT>--------------------------------
WHEAT o.o 3.8 23.7 3 7.5 46.5 55.6 40.8 
CORN o.o 13. 1 24.0 53.8 68.2 77.5 55.9 
SOYBEANS o.o 6.9 30.1 35.8 58.9 48.3 43.4 
TOTAL o.o 8.3 25.9 42.2 58.6 61.9 4 7.2 
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TABLE 14. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON U.S. CASH RECEIPTS, PRODUCTION EXPENSES, AND NET 
FARM INCOME 
YEAR 
ACTUAL 
CASH RECE I PT S 
CROPS 
L I VESTOO< 
TOTAL 
GOV. PAYMENTS 
TOT RECEIPTS BEFORE INV, CHANGE 
PRODUCTION EXPENSES 
NET INCOME BEFORE INV. CHANGE 
VALUE OF INV, CHANGE 
NET FARM INCOME 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE (CHANGE FROM ACTUAL) 
CASH RECEIPTS 
CROPS 
L1 VESTOO< 
TOTAL 
GOV. PAYMENTS 
TOT RECEIPTS BEFORE INV. CHANGE 
PRODUCTION EXPENSES 
NET INCOME BEFORE INV. CHANGE 
VALUE OF INV. CHANGE 
NET FARM INCOME 
PERCENT CHANGE OVER ACTUAL 
CASH RECEIPTS 
CROPS 
Ll VESTOO< 
TOTAL 
GOV PAYMENTS 
TOT RECEIPTS BEFORE INV, CHANGE 
PRODUCTION EXPENSES 
NET INCOME BEFORE INV. CHANGE 
VALUE OF INV, CHANGE 
NET FARM I NCOME 
1981 1982 1983 1984 81-84 AVE 
-------------------(BILLION DOLLARS)----------------
72.9 72.7 66,8 69. I 70.4 
69,2 70.3 69.4 72.7 70.4 
142. I 143,0 136.2 141.8 140.8 
I ,9 3.5 9.3 8.4 5.8 
160.2 163.0 161 .2 166.2 162.6 
136. 1 136.9 135.6 139.5 137.0 
24.1 26.1 25.6 26.7 25.6 
5.8 -1.4 -10.6 7. B 0.4 
29.9 24,7 15.0 34.5 26.2 
2. 0 4. 7 12.3 14.8 8.5 
-0.7 -0.6 0.3 0.5 -o. 1 
1.3 4. 1 12.6 I 5. 3 8.3 
-0.9 -1.4 -7 .I -6.0 -3.9 
0,5 3.0 6.1 10.6 5. 1 
-1.6 -1.4 12.0 11.4 5. 1 
2 ,I 4.3 -5.9 0.8 0.3 
o.s 0.2 3.6 -0.6 1.0 
2.9 4,5 -2.3 -I .4 0.9 
----------------------(PERCENT>---------------------
2. 74 6.46 18,41 21.42 12.26 
-1.01 -0.85 0.43 0,69 -0.19 
0,91 2,87 9.25 I O. 79 s. 96 
-47,37 -40.00 -76.34 -71.43 -58.79 
0.31 1.84 3. 78 6.37 3.08 
-I. 18 -1.02 8.85 B. 17 3. 72 
B. 71 16,48 -23.05 3,00 I • I 7 
13.79 -14.29 -33,96 -7.69 -10.38 
9,70 18.22 -I 5.33 -4.06 3.44 
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Production expenses are influenced both by the changing 
macroeconomic assumptions and by the increases in crop area planted 
and harvested. Estimated expenses change less than one percent in 
the first two years but rise sharply in the last two y~ars when 
planted area is from 12 to 27 percent higher. The final element of 
net farm income is the inventory change. This impact is positive in 
most years and is especially high during 1983, because the changed 
commodity market conditions mean farmers do not store as much of 
their commodities under loan. 
The result of these changes in receipts, expenses, and 
inventories is that the macro alternative assumptions increase net 
farm income by $3 to $4.5 billion in the first two years and reduce 
it by $1.4 to $2.3 billion in the last two years (Figure 7). Over 
the four year period net farm income on average is higher by about 
$1 billion per year. The indicators, however, that the more 
favorable macro alternative would cause net farm income to decline 
in any year at first seems like an anomaly. It appears that the 
results of the last two years are unusual largely because of the PIK 
program. The foregone PIK payments of $6 to $7 billion the last two 
years are apparently larger than the profits farmers could have 
earned by putting the land into production. 
Government Stocks and Costs 
The higher prices generated under the macroeconomic alternative 
make it possible to release some government-owned and farmer-owned 
res~rve stocks during the period of analysis. As indicated in Table 
15, relatively few farmer-owned reserve stocks and no CCC stocks ar~ 
released for wheat. By contrast, farmer-owned reserve stocks of 
corn are completely emptied in 3 of the 5 years and government 
stocks are emptied in the last two years. This difference exists 
because the release price for corn is not as high relative to the 
loan rate as it is for wheat. The very small amounts of government 
soybean stocks are also emptied out during this period. 
The lower stock levels, in addition to the elimination of PIK 
and paid diversion programs and the reduction or elimination of 
deficiency payments in many years, lead to a substantial decline in 
government program costs during this period (Figure 8). Costs 1n 
1982/83 to 1984/85 are 43 to 54 percent lower and the average 
savings over the last four years are over $7 billion per year. 
More detail on these estimated cost reductions is provided in 
Table 16. Deficiency and diversion payments are eliminated 
completely in the first five years and reduced by over 70 percent in 
fiscal year 1984/85. All the PIK payments for acreage reduction are 
also eliminated. Net loan activity costs are lower because when 
market prices are higher fewer loans are taken out and a higher 
proportion are repaid. The lower FOR and government stock levels 
also mean lower storage costs and producer storage payments. These 
estimated savings are probably conservative, since it was not 
possible to estimate interest cost savings. 
29 
"T 
~~ 
--
iXJ 
--
-
---==--- I ~' 
_....r_::::---- I 
i 
_,_....-- ' 
' 
C"'J ~ w I / I I i 
~ 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.::; r- ,:o 
0 
w ~~ 
~ Q 
u 
> <{ ~"" 2 0 co u ~---------- r--~ 
"'--- ~ ~ 
..,-- ) •Y 2 <{ 0:::: UJ ·::o ~ ~ 
<( ' ~ ; 
LL ~ i I _j I <{ f--- r => I t-
w / ' ,'__j I <{ 7 
"" I r--I 0 
' . l r-. CJ 
"' 
' ;;l I 
"" I ..... 
"" I ~. ('/ r r-----~ r 
\ I ' I I 
0 
r-
<D 7 C'/ 0 iXJ (() 7 N 0 co <D 
"" 
C'/ 
... , r<l 
"'' 
n N N N N N 
$ t'-101lll8 
30 
TABLE 15. EFFECTS OF MACRO ALTERNATIVE SCENARIO ON U.S. GOVERNMENT STOCKS OF WHEAT, CORN, .A.ND 
SOYBEANS 
YEAR 79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 81-84 AVE 
----------------------------(MILLION BUSHELS!----------------------------
ACTUAL 
WHEAT 
FOR 260 360 560 I 060 I 010 654 821 
CCC 188 200 190 192 188 378 23 7 
CORN 
FOR 619 180 1274 1508 425 437 911 
CCC 249 232 294 1134 201 240 467 
SOYBEANS 
CCC 0 0 3 21 0 32 14 
MACRO ALTERNATIVE 
WHEAT 
FOR 260 360 3 70 853 857 654 584 
CCC 188 200 190 192 188 3 78 23 7 
CORN 
FOR 619 0 671 865 0 0 384 
CCC 249 232 232 232 0 0 11 6 
SOYBEANS 
CCC 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
PERCENT CHANGE --------------------------------(PERCENT)--------------------------------
WHEAT 
FOR o.o O. I -33.9 -19.6 -I 5. 1 o.o -17.2 
CCC o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o o.o 
CORN 
FOR o.o -100,0 -4 7.3 -42,6 -100.0 -100,0 -72.5 
CCC o.o 0,2 -21,0 -79,5 -100.0 -100.0 -75. I 
SOYBEANS 
CCC o. 0 o.o -I oo. 0 -100.0 o. 0 -100.0 -75.0 
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Table 16. CCC Outlay Changes for Wheat, Feedgrains and Soybean Programs under 
the Alternative Macro Scenario. 
Direct payments a 
PIK programb 
Loan Programs c 
Total 
a Deficiency and 
b PIK payments 
Fiscal Years 
79/80 80/81 81/82 82/83 83/84 84/85 
81-84 
Average 
-------------------(Million Dollars)--------------------
-136 0 -696 -2268 -1522 -3873 -2090 
0 0 0 - 403 -7055 - 611 -2017 
0 -23 -2665 -6232 148 -3331 -3020 
-136 -23 -3361 -8903 -8429 -7815 -7127 
diversion payments 
c Loans and purchases less repayments and sales plus storage and handling plus 
FOR storage payments. 
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Conclusions 
It 1s clear that the continuation of the 1970s macroeconomic 
environment would have had a substantial positive impact on both 
domestic and foreign demand for these commodities. In the case of 
corn, the combined effects of these high rates of demand growth are 
strong enough to empty the farmer-owned reserve and the 
government-owned stocks in three of the five years of the analysis. 
Wheat reserve stocks are drawn down slightly and soybean government 
stocks are completely eliminated. All of the PIK and paid diversion 
programs are no longer needed in the 1980s, which results in 
additional substantial savings to the government treasury. 
Under this hypothetical scenario the value of exports continues 
to grow during the period, though not as rapidly as it did during 
the 1970s (Figure 6). We cannot speculate as to how this 
hypothetical macroeconomic environment could have been brought about 
during the 1980s or even whether it would have been possible at all. 
We can strongly conclude from the impacts of continuing the 1970s 
environment, however, that the change in the macroeconomic 
environment that did take place at the turn of the decade had a 
powerful depressing impact on the U.S. agricultural sector. The 
slowing income growth in both developed and developing countries 
stunted the growth in total demand for these products and the 
strengthening of the U.S. dollar made U.S. products less competitive 
with other exporters. These are the two major factors that are at 
work in this analysis. 
These results provide strong quantitative evidence in support 
of what many economists, legislators, and farm leaders have 
suggested: that the performance of the U.S. agricultural sector 
depends heavily upon the performance of the U.S. and international 
macroeconomies. This analysis concludes that the unfavorabl~ 
macroeconomic environment in the 1980s substantially reduced the 
volume and value of exports and the level of farm prices. Since the 
commodity programs are designed to reduce price and income risk for 
farmers, a major impact of the general economic deterioration was a 
substantial increase in government costs associated with loan 
programs, income payments, and stock disposal through PIK. Thus in 
this analysis there was a much larger impact on government cost than 
on net farm income. The government programs, in effect, absorbed 
much of the market impact of the unfavorable macroeconomic 
conditions. 
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Figure A.4. Livestock Product Prices under Alternative Economic Conditions 
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Figure A.3. Income Levels under Alternative Economic Conditions 
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Figure A.2. Real Exchange Rates under Alternative Economic Conditions 
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Figure A.l. Inflation Rates under Alternative Economic Conditions 
Index 1980 = 1 00 Index 1975 = 1 00 Index 1980 = 100 
130 220 180 
CPI for Australia U.S. GNP deflator CPI for Canada 
115 Alternate-) ' 
! 
180 / 140 
100 
_/ ./ 
' ' 
' 
85 140 100 
-Actual 
70 
100 60 
55 
40 60 20 
1970 75 80 85 1970 75 80 85 1970 75 80 S5 
Index 1980 = I 00 Index 19SO = 100 Index 1975 = 100 
130 
CPI lor Tlialland 
120 
CPI for Japan 
250 
CPI for the EC 
110 I / ... ········ 100 200 I 90 .... ···· 
so 150 
70 -
60 100 
50 
30 40 50 
1970 75 80 S5 1970 75 so S5 1970 75 so S5 
Index 19SO = I 00 Index 1979 = 100 Index 1980 = 100 
ISO 200 1SO CPI lor Spain CPI lor Argenllna CPI for South Afr~ca 
I 
(x 1 000) 
140 150 140 
100 100 100 
60 50 60 
20LL~w_~~~~-Lu o LL.L__.__.__LLL-'--'--'~J~. ·u· 20LL~~w_~~~w_u 
1970 75 80 85 1970 75 80 85 1970 75 80 S5 
Thble A.B. <hnpulation of Price and IncCllle E1ast icities foe Net linpoel funand in Selected Regions NOt Included in the &ooon=te ic 
Mxlel 
Net lhn=stic (2)-(J) n (n><ffi) ed es e· Alj. &t l 
Impxts Consunpt ion lOCate Alj. l!JCC~lle funarrl Supply Price Import 
Region (!) (2) (2)/(1) (!) Elast. Elast. Elast. Elasl. Trans. Elasticity 
1000 Mr 
WHEAT 
NOeth Africa and 
Middle Easta 20026.0 48098.0 2.41 1.41 0.35 0.841 -{).2 0.2 0.4 -{).306 
a.-JES furope 220.0 9268.0 42.127 41. 127 0.15 6.32 -{). 2 0.2 0.25 -4.163 
Oth. Asiab 12328.0 28505.0 2.31 1. 31 0.40 0.925 -{). 5 0.2 0.2 -{).362 
Oth. Sou. ~ricac 8312.0 12016.0 1.446 0.446 0.25 0.361 -{).2 0.2 0.5 -{).378 
RCW** 10136.0 54939.0 5.42 4.42 0.40 2.17 -<l. 7 0.2 o. 25 -1. 170 
FEEOCRAINS 
High liJCme 
East Asia 8263.0 9513.0 1.151 0.151 0.45 0. 518 -<l.7 0.2 0.6 -{). 502 
East Europe 3390.0 70891.0 20.912 19.912 0.35 7.32 -{).3 0.2 0.5 -5. 128 
+' 
w 
RCW** 24543.0 173197.0 7.057 6.057 0.40 2.82 -{).5 0.2 0.35 -1.659 
SOYMEAL 
01ina 475.0 1019.0 2.145 0.40 0.86 
USSR 1211.0 2358.0 2.00 0.30 o. 58 
RCW** 8200.0 14920.0 1.820 0.820 0.40 0.73 -{).3 0.2 0.5 -{).355 
SOYBEAN 
Olina 568.6 8775.0 15.433 0.2 3.09 
USSR 1269.0 1785.0 1.41 0.3 0.42 
r-ffi; (C2(-j'>; *caupuled as edei - e 5t:\l 
**rest of v.orld (ioclud~s all cwntries and regions not 1 is ted in Tables A.1 to A.B.) 
a 
exc tudes F..gypl 
b excludes India 
c 
excludes Central /u~rica 
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Table A. 7. Price Transmission Elasticities of Feedgrain Prices with Respect 
to U.S. Feedgrain Prices 
Country 
Canada 
Barley 
Corn 
Australia 
Barley 
Argentina 
Corn 
Sorghum 
Thailand 
Corn 
South Africa 
Feed gra1n 
EC(lO) 
Corn 
Barley 
Spain 
Corn 
USSR 
Feed gra1n 
Japan 
Corn 
U.S. Corn Price U.S. Barley Price U.S. Sorghum Price 
0.84 
0.96 
l. 12 
l. 10 
1. 14 
l. 12 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.75 
0.0 o.o 0.0 
0. 97 
Table A. 6. Summary of Estimated Domestic Demand Elasticities from the Feed Grains 
Model 
-------------------------Elasticities of---------------------------------
Livestock 
Corn Sorghum Barley Soyrneal Wheat Cassava Product 
Country Price Price Price Price Price Price Price Income 
u.s. 
l:Oi'"n food -0.19 
Corn feed -0. 18 0. 18 0.20 0. 13 
Corn stock -0.67 
Canada 
Barley and 
corn total 
use -0.08 0.14 0.05 0.25 
Australia 
Barley 
total use -1. 16 0. 78 
Ar~entina 
Corn total 
use -0. 14 o. 14 
Sorghum 
total use o. 98 -3.17 
Thailand 
Corn and 
sorghum 
total use -0. 14 0.14 0.25 
South Africa 
Feed gra1n 
o.et imports 2.00 
EC(lO) 
Corn feed -0.05 0.05 0.88 
Corn food -0.70 
Barley feed -0.26 o. 02 0.06 
Barley food -0.39 0. 58 
SEaio. 
Corn -0.21 
Soviet Union 
F'eed gra1n 
total use 0.37 
Japan 
Corn and 
sorghum 
total use -0.20 0. 16 
corn and 
sorghum 
stock -0.46 -0.45 0.95 
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Table A.S. Summary of Estimated Production Elasticities from the Feed Grains 
Model 
Country 
u.s. 
Corn 
Canada 
Barley 
Corn 
Australia 
Barley 
Argentina 
Sorghum 
Corn 
Thailand 
Corn and 
Sorghum 
EC (l 0) 
Corn 
Barley 
--------------------------Elasticities 
Corn Sorghum Barley Wheat 
Price Price Price Price 
0.07 
0.26 
1.10 
0.30 
0.39 
0. 10 
-0.97 
0. 74 
0.34 
0. 70 
-0.47 
-0.29 
of--------------------------
Soybean 
Price 
-0.13 
-0.20 
Cassava 
Price 
-0.06 
Rice 
Price 
-0. 28 
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Table A.4. Price Transmission Elasticities of Wheat Prices of Other Regions 
with Respect to World Pricea 
RGULFUS 
Regions U.S. Wheat Gulf Port Price 
Canada 
Wheat export pr1ce l. 13 
Australia 
Wheat export price 0.97 
Argentina 
Wheat farm price 0.28 
Japan 
Wheat resale price 0.28 
aPrice transmission elasticities for other regions--European Community, 
India, and Centrally Planned Economies are zero. 
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Table A.3. Summary of Estimated Domestic Supply and Demand Elasticities from 
the Wheat Trade Model 
Country 
u.s. 
----p;oduc t ion 
Food demand 
Feed demand 
Stock demand 
Canada 
Product ion 
Feed demand 
Stock demand 
Australia 
Product ion 
Stock demand 
Argentina 
Product on 
Food demand 
EC 
-Production 
Feed demand 
India 
Product ion 
Food demand 
Japan 
Total use 
USSR 
~od demand 
China 
Total use 
East Europe 
Total use 
-------------------Elasticity with 
Wheat Barley Sorghum 
Price Price Price 
0. 20 
-0. 14 
-3.01 
-0.28 
0.38 
-0.12 
-0.28 
0.01 
-0.43 
0.50 
-0.16 
0.66 
-3.11 
0.44 
-0.45 
-0. 12 
l. 17 
-0.30 
-0.63 
6.04 
-0.04 
respect 
Rice 
Price 
0.48 
to-------------------
Soymeal 
Price Income 
0.55 
0.08 
0. 73 
0. 22 
. 0. 23 
0. 59 
0.28 
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Table A.2. Price Transmission Elasticities of Soybean and Soymeal Prices of 
Other Regions with Respect to U.S. Soybean and Soymeal Prices 
Regions Soybean Price Soymeal Price 
Brazil l. 80 1' oa 
Argent ina 0.97 0.96 
European Community 0.90 0.88 
Spain 0.86 0.84 
Japan 0.91 0. 53 
East~rn Europe 0.88 0.88 
Rest of World l. 00 
aThe domestic soymeal price ~s subject to government control and hence 
does not respond to U.S. soymea1 price. The U.S. soymea1 price is used for the 
Brazil soymeal export price and thus price transmission elasticity is 1. 
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Table A.l. Pr1ce Elasticities of Supply and Demand from the Soybeaa Tcade '1ode l 
Value of 
Soybean Soymeal Soyoil '1eal and Corn 
Price Pr1ce Price Oil Price 
u.s. 
Production 0.71 
Soybeaa crush -2.08 l. 96 
Soybean stocks -0.69 
Soymeal demaad -0.41 0. 19 
Soyoil demand -0.45 
Soyoil stocks -0.13 
Brazil 
Production 0.08 
Soybean crush -0.50 l. 00 
Soymeal demand -0.34 -0.21 
Ar~entina 
Pro duet ion 0.27 
Soybean crush -2.26 2.50 
Soymeal demand -0,18 
EC 
Soybeaa crush -1.91 l. 99 
Soymeal demand -0.27 0.25 
Spaia 
Soybeaa crush -4.87 5.05 
Soymeal demand -0.32 0.44 
Japan 
Soybean crush -0.26 0.16 
Soymeal demand -0.07 
Eastern Europe 
Soybean crush -2.20 1.84 
Rest of Wocld 
Soymeal demand -0.30 
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Appendix 
FAPRI Regional Trade Model Specifications and Estimated Elasticities 
The necessary components of this model are detailed 1n the following 
equations: 
(1) EDT l:DM· l:SM· = l:f.(P., x.) l:h-(P., z. ) i = 1, .. , n Importers 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
(2) ESO = l:SX· l:DX. Lh/Pj, z.) l:fi(Pj, X.) J = 1, .. ,m Exporters J J J J 
(3) ESUS hu (p u' Zu) - fu(Pu, X) u = u.s.' United States Exports 
(4) ESUS = EDT - ESO World Market Equilibrium 
( 5) p. 1 = p e. u 1 + Mi i I, .. ,n 
(6) p. 
J 
p e. 
u J + M· J J 1, .. ,m 
where 
DM = importer demand 
DX exporter demand 
e ~ exchange rate 
M =trade margin (transport cost, tariff, subsidy, etc.) 
P domestic price 
SM = importer supply 
SX exporter supply 
X = vector of demand shifters 
Z = vector of supply shifters 
In most cases, the supply and demand relationships, fi and hi, are the 
estimated equations in the model. In a few instances net trade equations are 
estimated directly. The tables that follow outline the structural components 
of the model and report the estimated price and income elasticities. 
